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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
BIG DITCH IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
a Utah nonprofit corporation; J AMES 
GARSIDE; J L.C, a Utah limited liability 
company; and RYAN LITKE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20090757 
BRIEF OF SHAREHOLDER APPELLANTS 
(JAMES GARSIDE, J L.C, and RYAN LITKE) 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
a. Whether the district court erred in failing to dismiss claims against various 
shareholder defendants ("shareholders") who were merely shareholders in the parent entity and 
key defendant, Big Ditch Irrigation Company ("Big Ditch"). Grant or denial of motion to 
dismiss is reviewed for correctness.1 This issue was preserved below at R. 170-84. 
b. Whether the district court erred in failing to dismiss claims against various 
shareholder defendants who had no pending counterclaims against Salt Lake City ("SLC"), even 
lMack v. Utah State DOC, 2009 UT 47,115, 221 P.3d 194. 
1 
though the district court stated that existing counterclaims were the basis for retaining them in 
the suit. Correlatively, whether the district court erred in failing to correct its memorandum 
decision once the shareholders clarified, in a motion, that they were not asserting such 
counterclaims. Grant or denial of motion to dismiss is reviewed for correctness.2 This issue was 
preserved below at R. 170-216, 1047-81, 1172-92. 
c. Alternatively, if the shareholders were deemed to be bringing counterclaims, 
whether the district court erred in dismissing the antitrust counterclaim by failing to properly 
assess the legal adequacy of the counterclaim, and whether the district court misapplied relevant 
statutory and common law immunity to SLC, which was alleged to be an aggressive and 
improper market participant. This decision is reviewed for correctness.3 This issue was 
preserved below at R. 170-84, 202-16. 
d. Whether the district court improperly denied the shareholders' motion for a stay 
pending discovery under Rule 56(f) in the face of SLC's motion for summary judgment. Denial 
of a Rule 56(f) motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion.4 This issue was preserved below at 
R. 392. 
e. Whether the district court erred in refusing to dismiss the shareholder defendants 
after SLC's slander of title claims against them were dismissed, and based on SLC's contention 
that it could continue to sue the shareholders for unresolved inchoate claims that the 
2Mack v. Utah State DOC, 2009 UT 47 at ]f 15. 
"Id 
"Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). 
2 
shareholders might someday bring against SLC (but were not being asserted in the instant suit). 
This is a denial of a motion to dismiss and is reviewed for correctness.5 This issue was preserved 
below at R. 5369-86. 
DISPOSITIVE AUTHORITIES 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3—3 and -3.5 are attached in the Addendum, together with other 
relevant authority. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from the denial and grant of multiple motions 
for summary judgment in a civil case. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below, 
SLC commenced this case by filing a complaint against Big Ditch and four Big Ditch 
shareholders. R. 1. SLC and Big Ditch had executed a water exchange contract in 1905. The 
complaint alleged that Big Ditch and shareholder J L.C. had wrongfully filed change applications 
on its contract water; that, as the water's owner, SLC could veto any change application; that Big 
Ditch and J L.C. had slandered SLC's title by filing the change applications; and that the named 
shareholders had "challenged" SLC's "legally protected interests." 
Big Ditch and the shareholders filed an answer and counterclaim. R. 69. The 
counterclaim alleged, inter alia, breach of contract and antitrust violations based on SLC's 
disproportionate and illegal role as a water market player. SLC filed a motion to dismiss the 
sAuila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah 1990). 
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antitrust counterclaim. R. 100. The shareholders filed a counter motion for summary judgment 
for failure to state a claim. R. 167. SLC had not yet responded to the counterclaim.6 
The shareholders' counter motion was based on their shareholder status—the fact that 
they were legally incapable, as mere shareholders of SLCs exchange partner Big Ditch, of 
committing the malfeasance SLC alleged. 
While SLCs motion was pending, and before SLC responded to the appellants' 
counterclaim, the appellants amended their counterclaim and answer as a matter of right on 
October 25, 2007 under Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 251. The 
shareholders dropped their counterclaims, and Big Ditch made changes to its allegations. 
The district court granted SLCs motion to dismiss on October 30, 2007. R. 272. This 
ruling was based on the original, not the amended, counterclaims. The district court stated that 
the "defendants" had failed to sufficiently allege any antitrust claims, although only one 
defendant, Big Ditch, remained as a counterclaimant. The district court deemed deficient the 
original counterclaim, but did not address the amended counterclaim. The district court also 
denied the shareholders' motion to dismiss, R. 277, again relying on the original, not the 
amended, counterclaims. 
Big Ditch and the shareholders then filed motions addressing the status of the docket at 
the time of the district court's October 30,2007 ruling.7 R. 1047-1192. The gist of the motions 
6SLC finally did so on December 3, 2007. R. 343. 
7In the interim the defendants filed a motion to dismiss SLCs slander of tide claims, which the 
district court granted on September 30, 2008. R. 4634. None of the parties have appealed this 
decision. 
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was that the district court had misread the docket, and that it should either reinstate various 
claims wrongfully dismissed, or declare that it lacked the power in the first instance to dismiss 
claims no longer pending before it. 
The motions were logically related and internally cross-referenced, with some being 
made only in the alternative. See, e.g. R.. 1051 n.2,1052 n.3,1083 n.l, 1086 n.l, 1110-11, 1175 
n. 5. Ultimately the district court denied the motions, stating with respect to the shareholders 
that they continued to "pursue" the antitrust claims up until the time the October 30, 2007 
decision was rendered, even though the shareholders had dropped their counterclaims prior to 
that ruling. R. 2946. 
On September 30,2008, the district court dismissed SLC's Slander of Title claims against 
all parties, including the shareholders. R. 4634. 
On October 27, 2008, the district court denied a motion for protective order filed by J 
L.C. R. 4838. Part of the basis for the motion for protective order was that with the dismissal 
of the slander of title claims, SLC no longer had any remaining claims against the shareholders. 
The district court disagreed, stating that SLC's "pleadings" still named the shareholders as 
defendants. R. 4839. 
Accordingly, on December 2, 2008, the shareholders filed a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that SLC's causes of action no longer concerned the shareholders. R. 5369. 
The district court denied this motion on July 6,2009, stating that the shareholders had conceded 
SLC's position by filing their motion for summary judgment. R. 6339. 
5 
C. Statement of Facts. In 1905 Big Ditch and SLC entered into a water exchange 
contract. R. 19. Big Ditch transferred to SLC the right to divert and use the water it had been 
taking from Big Cottonwood Creek. In exchange, SLC would timely deliver a fixed amount of 
water to Big Ditch, tied to the measured flow in the creek. The exchange gave SLC high quality 
canyon water and gave Big Ditch a more constant flow of water at Big Ditch's diversion point 
from sources of SLC's choosing. Over the next thirty years SLC executed 31 similar exchange 
contracts with other companies. R. 5310. 
In 1914, The Progress Co. v. Salt Lake Citf adjudicated a dispute between SLC and the 
Progress Company. The Progress Company claimed that it had the right to divert water from 
the creek for a power plant, and challenged SLC's right to take water from the creek under the 
exchange agreements. A decision was rendered for SLC and its exchange partners. It fixed the 
amount of water SLC (on behalf of Big Ditch) could divert from the creek, and in turn 
recognized that SLC could take this water "by virtue o f the 1905 contract. R. 28. 
In the intervening decades, SLC either never claimed or eschewed tide to Big Ditch's 
contract water. R. 1383-92. During this time Big Ditch's service area gradually urbanized, and, 
while SLC continued to deliver Big Ditch's full contractual amount through the diversion 
structure, Big Ditch turned less water into its conduit. SLC also acquired water rights exceeding 
its contemporary or projected needs and leased these as "surplus." R. 6302. It also engaged in 
aggressive practices to control and eventually eliminate its exchange partners, R. 4274-75, 
;Civil No. 8921 (Third Dist. Utah 1914). 
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characterizing these water users as "dangerous" an<; nister" who \\< iM *'«.» .! to respond to 
SLC's "muscle." R. 6289-90. 
In 2006 Big Ditch filed a number of administrative change applications to change points 
of diversion of its exchange water for the benefit of a number of shareholders. SLC protested 
and then, in 2007, sued Big Ditch and the Big Ditch shareholders for filing the change 
applications. SLC claimed that Big Ditch had no residual entitlement to file such applications, 
and further claimed that the shareholders violated their legal obligations to SLC.9 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The shareholders are merely members of SLC's exchange partner, Big Ditch. They have 
no privity with, nor duty toward, SLC. They can no more be liable to SLC than can an owner 
of Ford stock be liable for a pick-up rollover. Yet SLC claimed the shareholders were 
"challenging" SLC's "legally protected interests." The shareholders moved i < *; t v>\ i nss T ais vague 
and incognizable attempt to harass the shareholders, but the district court denied the motion. 
One of the reasons the Court did so is that the shareholders were allegedly countersuing 
SLC for antitrust. A countersuit cannot validate an improper suit. Apart from this error, the 
district court did not realize that the shareholders had dropped their claims against SLC before 
the district court ruled. This eliminated countersuit as a basis for retaining the shareholders. 
(The shareholders tried to allow the trial court to remedy this error with a motion to reconsider; 
it was denied). 
9The balance of the facts are in the Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
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Even if the district court properly concluded that the shareholders continued to pursue 
SLC at the time the district court ruled, the claims the shareholders had brought were sufficient 
to survive dismissal. They properly pled antitrust violations, and SLC could not defeat them 
with a municipal status defense. Subsequent evidence adduced in the case substantiated the 
antitrust allegations. 
Toward the end of the case, after the district court dismissed SLC's meritless slander of 
tide claims, the shareholders claimed again that they were not proper parties, as they had no 
power to file change applications: the law did not empower them to commit the breach or tort 
SLC alleged. The district court regarded this lack of power argument as a concession, and 
entered judgment for SLC. This was error. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction. The shareholders should not be here. This Court ruled in East Jordan 
Irrigation Co. v. Morgan™ that shareholders cannot file change applications. With loss of privilege 
comes loss of responsibility, and loss of duty toward those who may be affected by that 
responsibility. 
Here, Big Ditch is the only entity that could be empowered to file a change application. 
That privilege is the subject of a legitimate dispute Big Ditch has with SLC. The shareholders 
have no such dispute. 
]
 East Jordan Irrigation Co. v. Morgan, 860 P.2d 310 (Utah 1993). 
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This does not mean the shareholders do not enjoy benefits from owning shares in Big 
Ditch. They do. Strawberry High Une Canal Co. v. Bureau ofReclamation11 states that companies are 
to protect their shareholders' rights to enjoy their water use. (The district court stripped Big 
Ditch of its abilit) to protect shareholders by declaring that Big Ditch cannot file change 
applications when its shareholders so request.)12 
Inasmuch as the shareholders have the right to petition the company to file change 
applications, if that right is taken away, there is little the shareholders can do to enforce their 
diversionary rights as shareholders in the company. Yet, little as those rights were regarded by 
the district court, there is not, and never was, anything they can do against SLC, a party with 
whom they have no privity. They can only look to Big Ditch, which, under Strawberry, is tasked 
with shielding and protecting the shareholders' diversion uses. 
Even so, SLC has secured a judgment against the shareholders to prevent them from ever 
pursuing SLC. In the process, it has stripped them of many of the rights they have within Big 
Ditch. Given SLC's strategic plan to control, and then kill, irrigation companies, perhaps this 
is SLC's objective. 
11{Strawberry High Une Canal Co. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 2006 U i' 1 * -6, 133 P.3d 410. 
12Big Ditch's exchange contract is like any other exchange. As an example, a city with surplus 
tractors and a farmer with one tractor agree to exchange the use of their tractors. New laws 
require tractor owner's registration to operate on state roads. The city claims title to both tractors 
and refuses to allow the tractor now used by the farmer to be registered. The tractor can't leave 
the original farm, which is now urbanized. The city sues, claiming that since the tractor cannot 
drive on the road to be used on what distant fields are left to be farmed, then the city is entitled 
to keep both tractors. The farmer who helped the city now has no tractor. The city has another 
surplus tractor. 
9 
No matter what SLC's motives are, the district court's decision to issue a judgment 
against the shareholders for actions they cannot commit was error, and should be reversed. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE 
SHAREHOLDERS' MOTION TO DISMISS. 
The district court ruled that the shareholders, by virtue of their pursuing SLC with 
counterclaims, could not claim that they were immune from suit by SLC. The court also ruled 
that the shareholders could not rely only on the lack of required allegations in SLC's complaint 
to support their claim of immunity, and that J L.C. could not avoid being sued because it had 
signed the offending change applications (and had produced no evidence as to why it should be 
immune). R. 272. 
A. The Shareholders Were Immune From Suit Based on Their Status as 
Shareholders. 
The district court ruled that the shareholders were proper defendants, and could not rely 
only on the allegations in SLC's complaint to support their claim that they were not proper 
defendants. R. 272. The district court erred. 
Generally, officers and stockholders of corporations are "not held to be in privity with 
their corporations and are not personally bound by judgments against those corporations."13 
X2>Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, 2005 UT 19, ^ 37, 110 P.3d 678, 688; see Reedekerv. 
Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ('"The general rule is that a corporation is an 
entity separate and distinct from its officers, shareholders and directors and that they will not 
be held personally liable for the corporation's debts and obligations.'" (citation omitted)). 
10 
Thus, when an officer or director acts in his or her official capacity, he or she is It tin ii ine froin 
liability.14 This is true "whether the corporation has many stockholders or only one/'15 
This "corporate shield doctrine" completely protected the shareholders from liability. 
The shareholders were additionally iii'irnune because they did i lot "have or clan n [an] interest 
which would be affected by the" declaratory relief that SLC sought against them.16 An "interest" 
under the i - ^ ratory Judgments Act is "a substantial interest or a legally protectible [sic\ interest 
in the subject matter of the litigation."17 Based upon this definition, one court has lielc1 111;11 a 
party cannot be a part of an action for declaratory relief if the party does not "own" any part of 
the property in dispute.18 Therefore, the shareholders should have been dismissed because the 
property that is in dispute is not owned by them and they do not "have or claim [an] interest 
which would be affected by the declaration."19 
Notwithstanding this strong protection i ^strict c c , : 'i:u n <a the 
shareholders could not prove their immunity because they had cited only to SLC's complaint. 
Concededly, the shareholders' motion was entided a motion for partial summary judgment when 
uReedekery 952 P.2d at 582. 
xsColman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
16Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-403(l) (the only persons that may be included in a claim for 
declaratory relief are those "who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the 
declaration"). 
11
 Main Parking Mall v. Salt Lake City, 531 P.2d 866, 867 (Utah 1975). 
nAnschut^ Corp. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 632 F. Supp. 445, 449, 453 (D. Utah 1986). 
19Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-403(l). 
11 
it could have been entitled a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. But in motion 
practice, labels do not matter. The court looks to the substance, not form, of the relief sought 
to define the proper standard and remedy.20 The motion was, in all respects, a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion. The district court focused on the label, and confused the shareholders' Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion with a traditional motion for summary judgment supported by external documents. Yet 
a defense motion for summary judgment relying only on the complaint is acceptable under the 
rules, since it deals with the legal standards framed by the facts as alleged (which are the essence 
of the plaintiffs case).21 
Here, no further evidence beyond the complaint was required: a 12(b)(6) motion, by 
definition, rests on the pleadings.22 SLC failed allege how the shareholders were in any privity 
with it or had any duty toward it. SLC's only basis for suing Garside and Litke was that they 
were shareholders, officers, and/or directors of Big Ditch, which represented a threat to SLC's 
"legally protected interests." R. 12. This is an attack based purely on status. The district court 
wanted more, but the standard required no more: SLC's attack was legally insufficient. 
Shareholders cannot be sued simply because they are owners of a tortfeasor or breaching 
20Debry v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 520, 523 and n. 9 (Utah 1992) (Consistent with the 
requirement that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure be liberally construed, "the substance of a 
motion, not its caption, is controlling.") (citations omitted); Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 
P.2d 1346, 1347-48 (Utah 1960) ("If the nature of the motion can be ascertained from the 
substance of the instrument, . . . an improper caption is not fatal to that motion.") (citation 
omitted); see also Papasan v. Allan, 478 US 265 (1986) (In determining whether an Eleventh 
Amendment claim will be permitted the Supreme Court stated, "we look to the substance rather 
than to the form of the relief sought."). 
21See Brown v. Weiss, 871 P.2d 552, 560-61 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
22Whipple v. Am. Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996). 
12 
corporation. SLC's claims for declaratory relief against the shareholders should have been 
dismissed.23 
B, j L.C. Was Not Properly Retained as a Defendant Despite Its Signature on 
the Change Applications. 
The district court attached special significance to J L.C.'s signature on the offending 
change applications. The district court inferred privity or duty from the signature, and then 
placed the burden on j L.C. to escape this special status. This was error. 
J L.C. signed the change application solely in its capacity as a Big Ditch shareholder in 
an attempt to change its proportionate share of Big Ditch water as a Big Ditch shareholder. The 
change application was made only in Big Ditch's name and only in connection with Big Ditch 
water. J L.C.'s signature on the application was intended only as a convenience to Big Ditch. But 
for its status as a shareholder of Big Ditcl1, J I ,(< coi lid not have signed the change application.24 
Both Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3.5 and this Court's decision in East Jordan25 rendered J L.C. 
technically powerless to sign a change application by itself. That power lies solely in Big Ditch. 
M ; i ; ourt sought evidence, it needed onh
 (. • :te. 
Because all of J L.C.'s actions were performed solely as a product of J L.C.'s shareholder 
status, J L.C. enjoyed the same immunity as any other shareholder. This is true of the other 
23The same is true of SLC's claim that these shareholders' "actions and claims" threaten to injure 
SLC. R. 10. Nowhere, does SLC state what these alleged "actions and claims" are. Even if 
determinate, these "actions and claims" were in no way separate or independent of Garside and 
Litke's status as shareholders, officers, and/or directors of Big Ditch. 
24See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3.5(2). 
25East Jordan, 860 P.2c * - 1993). 
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arguments SLC made below, including its argument that J L.C. (and, presumably, all other 
shareholders ) was a phantom party to the 1905 contract and The Progress Company v. Salt hake 
City. R. 24. The contract and Progress concern only SLC and Big Ditch-not J L.C. Thus, there 
was no reason to include J L.C. as a defendant in the action inasmuch as J L.C. had nothing to 
do with either the 1905 contract or subsequent court decree. 
C. The Shareholders Were Not Pursuing Any Counterclaims When the 
District Court Ruled on Their Motion to Dismiss. 
In its ruling of October 30, 2007, R. 272, the district court referred exclusively to the 
original counterclaim, not the amended counterclaim, which was filed nearly a week before. The 
most obvious evidence of this is that the district court relied on the shareholders 
"counterclaims" as a basis to retain them as defendants, even though the shareholders dismissed 
without prejudice those counterclaims in the amended answer and counterclaim, as permitted 
by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a) and 41(a)(1). 
The fact that a party has countersued does not somehow cure a nonmeritorious cause of 
action. It appears that in so ruling the district court confused jurisdictional defects, which can 
sometimes be waived, with substantive defects, which cannot. A party may appear in an action 
and thereby waive a personal jurisdiction defense. In contrast, a valid counterclaim cannot 
breathe life into an invalid complaint. Summary judgment on the initial complaint, therefore, 
is not precluded by the existence of a counterclaim.26 
26See Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178,1180-81 (Utah 1993) (citing Reunion v. Amoss, 500 P.2d 512 
(Utah 1972)). 
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In part to correct the district court's errors, Big Dit. . iv -^  - m-li. Iders jointly filed 
two motions on February 28, 2008, in an effort to induce the district court to consider the state 
of its docket when it ruled: 
1. A Rule 54 Motion to Correct Memoranda in I Decision i ("Motion to Correct") 
sought to clarify the district court's memorandum decision. R. 1095. The district court's use of 
the term "defendants" was incorrect, since the shareholder defendants were not asserting any 
counterclaims at the time the district court issued the decision. Only Big Ditch continued 
pursuing counterclaims. R. 1047. 
2. A Rule 41 Motion to Dismiss Antitrust Claims Without Prejudice ("Motion to 
Dismiss") alternatively requested that the shareholder defendants (depending on how the district 
court ruled on the previous motions) have their antitrust claims dismissed without prejudice, 
thus simplifying the litigation and removing the preclusive effect of a dismissal with prejudice. 
R. 1102.27 
While Rule 54 relief is normally discretionary, that discretion is severely limited when the 
reconsideration is of a legal error.28 The district court mistakenly understood tliat t!le 
shareholders still were asserting claims against SLC. Eliminate those claims, and the district 
27The need to file motions to reconsider or correct would not have arisen had the district court 
accepted the appellants' cross-referencing and companioning of motions, see, e.g. R.. 1051 n.2, 
1052 n.3,1083 n.l, 1086 n.l, 1110-11,1175 n. 5, and ruled on them as analytical sets rather than 
chronologically piecemeal. Had it done so, it is highly likely that the motions to reconsider 
would not have been necessary, even in the face of adverse rulings. 
'SeeMid-Am. Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, f 14, 216 P.3d 352. 
court had no choice but to reverse itself. No discretion can be exercised based on a 
misunderstanding of the docket. 
Accordingly, the appellants argued that references to the "defendants" in dismissing 
Count V of the Counterclaim (antitrust) dealt exclusively with Big Ditch, since it was the only 
remaining counterclaimant. Indeed, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
adjudicate any of the shareholder defendants' dismissed claims, even if it desired to do so, since 
once the dismissals were effective, no case or controversy was before the Court. 
Big Ditch also argued, relatedly, that it ought to be permitted to cure the defects the 
district court perceived in its original counterclaim by looking to the amended counterclaim that 
was on file when the court ruled.29 By the time the defendants filed the motions, both Big Ditch 
and the shareholders had the common goal of simplifying the litigation by dismissing the 
antitrust counterclaims without prejudice. R. 1098. The shareholders contended that they had 
already done this as a matter of law. 
The district court denied the motions. R. 2946.30 While one of the motions asked the 
district court to review the record to correct its earlier decision, the district court persisted in 
relying on a nonexistent version of the record by stating that all of the defendants continued to 
29Big Ditch also filed a second amended counterclaim that specifically targeted the district court's 
concerns. R. 1109. Big Ditch argued that the court could not have ruled as it did had the second 
amended counterclaim been considered. This is treated in Big Ditch's brief. 
30Big Ditch filed a Motion to Amend and a Motion to Reconsider along with the two 
shareholder motions. The four motions were filed together because they were analytically 
related. The district court did not consider the Motion to Amend in this opinion, even though 
it was filed together with the other three motions, and was expressly incorporated into and 
companioned with the motion to reconsider as either an additional or alternative basis to 
reinstate the antitrust claims. R. 1110-11. 
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"pursue" the antitrust claims up until the time of the October 30,2007 decision. R. 2946. There 
is no basis for this statement It is unclear what the district court meant by "pursue." It was 
certainly not actively litigated, and was dropped on October 25, 2007, by the shareholders. 
The record confirms that no counterclaims by the shareholder defendants were pending 
at the time of the trial court's October 30,2007 decision. Even if the pendency of counterclaims 
could operate to validate SLC's claims against the shareholders, those counterclaims were no 
longer pending. The court erred in basing its decision on the pendency of counterclaims. 
D. The Antitrust Claims Were Sufficiently Meritorious to Withstand Dismissal. 
If this Court rules that the original counterclaim was not as a matter of law supplanted 
by the amended counterclaim, the district court still erred by concluding that defendants failed 
to make sufficient allegations supporting their antitrust claims in the original counterclaim. In 
the original counterclaim, defendants alleged that SLC competed with them in the same relevant 
marketplace.31 Specifically, the counterclaim alleged that SLC monopolized the water of Big 
Cottonwood Creek to control building and zoning in Big Cottonwood Canyon to the point of 
wasting Big Cottonwood Creek water (including a portion of Big Ditch's original water right); 
wasted other portions of Big Ditch's original water rights (upon which Big Ditch owns a 
reversionary right); interfered with Big Ditch's enjoyment of its contract water by meridessly 
protesting Big Ditch's change applications and thereby withholding Big Ditch's exchange water; 
competed against Big Ditch's shareholders for Big Ditch stock; intentionally blocked Big Ditch's 
ability to obtain proper state water use permits in order to devalue Big Ditch stock; unlawfully 
31After the shareholders dropped their antitrust claims, Big Ditch continued this claim, in 
modified and more specific form. 
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used Big Ditch's original water right in temporary "surplus" sales contracts to meet permanent 
state building water requirements; and encouraged others to block change applications like those 
filed by Big Ditch on behalf of the shareholders. These allegations were greatly enlarged in Big 
Ditch's second amended complaint, and were in large part verified by subsequent discovery and 
evidence adduced for other purposes.32 
The statute allows one who is injured or is threatened with injury to bring suit. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-919(l)(a). The allegations fit within this broad statutory mandate. The 
shareholders' allegations should have survived dismissal, as should have Big Ditch's (either in 
their first or second iteration). 
Notwithstanding the district court's statement to the contrary, allegations that SLC may 
have acted unilaterally are not fatal to or otherwise dispositive of the antitrust claim. Instead, a 
32See, e.g., R. 3080 (Director Hooton Memo to Mayor's Office of August 30,1993, detailing City's 
domination of small water company and promise to use "Salt Lake City's watershed management 
muscle to deny them water" and eventually eliminate the company); R. 2974,3072-78 (City buys 
up exchange partner Butler Ditch, then has company deed water to SLC; inconsistent with City's 
claim to title in the first instance); R. 6294 (Hooton Memorandum: City buys up and dissolves 
the exchange contract company Brown and Sanford Irrigation Company; "Hopefully this will 
begin a trend in this direction."); R. 6305 (Hooton Memorandum: City buys out exchange 
contract company Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation Company); R. 6302 (Hooton Memorandum: 
City has been selling surplus water to 30,000 connections and 140,000 residents, including Alta 
ski resort and residents of Little Cottonwood Canyon); R. 499 (GRAMA response: SLC made 
$20 million in extraterritorial water sales in FY 2006-07); R. 501, 503 (invoices documenting 
approximately $400,000 per annum in surplus sales to Jordanelle Special Service District); R. 
4274-75 (City watershed management plan reflects a strategy to "[ajctively acquire stock in 
mutual irrigation companies with which Salt Lake city has exchange contracts . . ., develop a 
program by which Salt Lake City can accept donations of water stock . . . , [and] eliminate the 
exchanges and purchase the contracts outright"); R. 5840 (Hooton Memorandum: SLC 
characterizes Farr Harper Ditch's attempts to transfer water up the canyon as "sinister."); R. 
6290, 6322 (Hooton Memorandum: City characterizes Silver Fork Pipeline President as 
"dangerous" because he threatened "to reduce the City's hold on water and influence 
development in the canyon.") 
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showing of unilateral conduct is sufficient to state a claim for violation of the Utah Antitrust 
Act. According to the Act, it is "unlawful for any person to monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize,... any part of trade or commerce," regardless of whether or not there is any sort 
of combination or conspiracy to monopolize. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-914(2). Although a 
showing of conspiracy to monopolize is one basis for bringing an antitrust claim, it is not the 
only basis: one may bring an antitrust claim whether or not such involves conspiratorial conduct. 
Indeed, a monopoly is, in its purest sense, simply an organization of one refusing to allow others 
a fair chance. As a result, the shareholders did not need to show that SLC acted in concert with 
another person. 
E. The District Court Erred by Denying the Shareholders' Final Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Midway though the case, the district court made two rulings important to the 
shareholders, the granting of a motion to dismiss SLC's slander claims, R. 4364, and the denial 
of J L.C.'s motion for a protective order. R. 4838. Together the two rulings explain the trial 
court's view as to why the shareholders even remained in the case: "while the Court recently 
granted defendant J L.C.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment pertaining to slander of tide, 
SLC continues to have claims (by way of its First and Second Causes of Action) which involve 
defendant J L.C. and which remain pending. Indeed, defendant J L.C. remains a party to this 
action and is subject to discovery." R. 4839. 
The pleadings did not support retaining the shareholders. The First Cause of Action did 
not concern the shareholders at all. As for the Second Cause of Action, it alleged that the 
19 
shareholders had "challenged" SLC's "legally protected interests" by filing change applications 
to use their shares outside the historic Big Ditch service area. While in and of itself failing to 
articulate any cognizable breach or tort recognized under Utah statutory or common law, the 
count was also defective because it was based on an erroneous assumption that the shareholders 
were capable of independendy asserting ownership of either water or a right to use water 
separate from that of Big Ditch.33 
As noted in Big Ditch's brief (here incorporated by reference), restricting water use by 
place or type violates Utah public policy, and is only permissible when the complaining party can 
show that the restriction protects it from prejudice or harm (such as depletion of its own water 
supply,34 or violation of a bargained-for contractual right, wherein a party is compensated for 
abandoning its freedom to use water as it pleases). The mere fact that the shareholders 
petitioned the company for permission to use their shares outside the Big Ditch service area is 
neither a tort nor a breach, as a matter of public policy. 
Moreover, a shareholder in a water company does not have ownership of the water the 
company owns. Rather, it may use water under a collectivized contract with the company.35 The 
legislature has codified this principle in section 73-3-3.5 of the Utah Code, which specifically 
33As already noted, the shareholders' bringing counterclaims could not have created a liability 
theory against the shareholders, and, in any event, the shareholders ceased pursuing SLC. 
34
"Impairment" is an important criterion in assessing change applications. Utah Code Ann. § 73-
3-3(2)(b). 
35East Jordan, 860 P.2d 310 (Utah 1993). 
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grants only a company, and not a shareholder, the right to file a change application.36 Since 
change applications can only be made by one with an entitlement to the use of water, one 
prohibited by the legislature from filing such an application cannot have such an entitlement. 
It is impossible for one that has no entitlement the use of water to make a valid "claim" 
to that water. Yet, when pressed, this is the position SLC took. In attempting to clarify SLC's 
pleadings, its attorney stated: 
J L.C. is still a proper party to those claims because it actually filed change 
applications under a claim of r ight . . . . The City is also entitled to a declaration 
of whether it is in breach of contract with regard to any rights that might pertain 
to the J L.C. shares. Mr. Litke is a proper party as he still holds shares for what 
appears to be the purpose of attributing water rights to those shares and then 
selling them, and the City is entitled to know both whether such ownership 
(without the ability to irrigate lands within the Big Ditch system) carries with it 
the right or authority to file change applications and whether the City is in breach 
of contract with regard to any rights that might pertain to his shares. 
R. 5382-83. 
This statement misrepresents the law. First, SLC claims that J L.C. filed the subject 
change applications under "claim of right." Section 73-3-3.5 recognizes no such claim, and J L.C. 
disavowed it, wishing to comply with the law. Second, a water right cannot be "attributed" to 
a share. The statute and East Jordan show that title, and entitlement, vest with the company; the 
shareholder has, residually, a contractual and fiduciary relationship with the company granting 
it the right to request that a change application be filed on its behalf. The attribution SLC claims 
is not cognizable in this relationship. It is a legal fiction SLC created to justify its continued 
prosecution of the shareholders. Third, a shareholder cannot ever have the right or authority 
36Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3.5(2) and (6). 
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to file a change application. This was, again, decided in East Jordan. Fourth, SLC's last claim 
really means, "We are suing the shareholders in case we breached a contract with them/5 SLC 
does not allege how it could be in privity with the shareholders, and there was no evidence that 
there was any contractual relationship between them and SLC. A suspicion that one might be 
breaching a contract is no basis for a suit 
Remarkably, the shareholders5 argument that they lacked the statutory or common law 
authority to file change applications was viewed as a "concession" by the district court. R. 6346. 
There was no concession. SLC filed suit to harass the shareholders, claiming fear of a power 
the shareholders did not have. A party denying the power to commit a breach or tort does not 
amount to a concession that a tort or breach has occurred. 
This is not to say that the shareholders are not sympathetic with Big Ditch's position in 
this appeal. To the contrary, as the shareholders' shield bearer,37 the shareholders can only wish 
Big Ditch well in pursuing its goal of securing the right to file change applications. 
Ultimately, SLC's objective in moving for summary judgment was to strip from the 
shareholders whatever residual rights they had under East Jordan to petition Big Ditch to file 
change applications. Stripping them of any status as beneficial users of water prevents them 
from participating in Big Ditch's corporate governance, at least as far as that governance 
concerns contractual or fiduciary duties concerning proper delivery of water. Perhaps SLC has 
plans to seize control of Big Ditch under its plan to drive exchange partners out of business. 
'Strawberry, 2006 UT 19 at \ 37. 
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R. 4274-75. Stripping away shareholders' rights to question the company's water management 
decisions is a means to that end. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court retained shareholder defendants who were powerless to wield the harm 
SLC claimed, and who were protected by the corporate shield doctrine. It dismissed with 
prejudice claims that were not even before it, misapplied the law governing those claims as a 
basis for their dismissal, and then, in the ultimate irony, used the claims to justify the 
shareholders' continuing presence in the suit. And at the end of the case, when the shareholders 
pointed out to the district court their inability to do what SLC claimed and asked to be 
dismissed, the district court treated this as a concession and entered judgment—for SLC. 
SLC's objective in suing both Big Ditch and its shareholders was to ensure that Big Ditch 
could not file change applications, and that the shareholders would lose their right to petition 
Big Ditch to do so. The shareholders now have lost all access to the Utah Division of Water 
Rights change application process through the two district court rulings. 
The district court should be reversed, with the shareholders' antitrust claim being treated 
as voluntarily dismissed without prejudice and the judgment in favor of SLC being vacated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7,SMay of February 2010. 
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